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Abstract
Drawing on interviews with non-EU citizens, who arrived as asylum seekers 
or students in Finland, I examine different aspects of materialisation of 
borders within the state. This article focuses on non-citizens’ negotiations 
with the immigration bureaucracy, in particular on administrative procedures 
in residence permit applications. The analysis of non-citizens’ immigration 
trajectories and various border struggles during the conditional period before 
obtaining a permanent residence permit reveals the non-linear nature of 
immigration. The immigration process involves transitions in the legal status, 
which consequently affect non-citizens’ position in the labour market, access 
to welfare services, and the terms of family reunification. The concept of 
administrative bordering introduced in this article highlights the significant 
role of the bureaucratic procedures in migration management. I argue that 
administrative bordering related to the inclusion and exclusion of non-citizens 
creates pervasive insecurity about one’s presence and future as it can 
potentially modify individual immigration trajectories.
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Introduction
In this article, based on an empirical research in Finland, I examine 
different materialisations of borders during the immigration process 
and migrants’ negotiations with the immigration bureaucracy. 
Immigration does not designate a linear path towards citizenship; 
rather, it consists of transitions in legal positions and overcoming 
various institutional and bureaucratic requirements for legal residence. 
Immigration is fundamentally a bureaucratic process, yet surprisingly, 
little attention has been paid to the concrete administrative practices 
in the migration literature. Migration governance continues inside 
the national space, but even the critical analysis of border controls 
focuses mainly on the repressive practices at external borders 
and the consequent irregularisation of migration (e.g. Karakayali & 
Rigo 2010; Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2013). While in the migration 
literature, it is often assumed that legally residing migrants are more 
or less in a similar position compared to citizens (Sainsbury 2012: 
129), the immigration system establishes diverse legal statuses for 
non-citizens, which differentiates the duration of residence and the 
access to labour markets and welfare services depending on the 
assigned reason of immigration (Könönen 2018). In addition to the 
immigration officials, who determine the legal status of non-citizens 
by making decisions on residence permit applications, also various 
other state institutions and non-state actors – such as social services, 
embassies, employers, and even banks – play a role in controlling 
non-citizens’ inclusion and exclusion in the society either directly or 
indirectly.
Borders denote for non-citizens a field of struggle “that take[s] 
shape around the ever more unstable line between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, between inclusion and exclusion” (Mezzadra & Neilson 
2013: 13). Here, I use border struggles as an analytical tool to 
trace the different materialisation of borders during the immigration 
process, which emerges as migrants try to negotiate a more secure 
position in the society. Empirically, the analysis is based on interviews 
with non-EU migrants without permanent status who had worked in 
the low-paid service sector in precarious conditions in Helsinki. In the 
empirical analysis, I discuss the complications in the organisation of 
everyday life caused by the lack of identity documents, bureaucratic 
processes in the residence permit applications, collateral effects of 
the different types of legal statuses on the social position of non-
citizens, and the pervasive insecurity related to presence and future. 
I introduce the concept of administrative bordering to emphasise 
the significant role of the administrative practices and discretionary 
power in migration governance. This article contributes to a better 
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understanding of the concrete functioning of immigration controls 
from the perspective of migrants and demonstrates insecurity and 
unpredictability related to the outcomes of administrative bordering.
Administrative bordering as part of migration 
governance
Balibar (2004: 109) wrote at the turn of the century that while borders 
“should be at the edge of territory, marking the point where it ends, 
it seems borders and institutional practices corresponding to them 
have been transported into the middle of political space”. Through 
the conditional legal statuses, borders follow migrants into the 
national space for years, where they can materialise in workplaces, 
schools, tax offices, social services, or banks – in fact, anywhere one 
needs to prove his or her identity or “wherever selective controls are 
to be found” (Balibar 2002: 84). Immigration law establishes internal 
borders inside the state or as Bosniak (2007: 2551) wrote: “Indeed, it 
is the internalized border that defines aliens as aliens, that imposes 
conditions on their presence, and that claims the authority to detain 
and deport them in various circumstances”. De Genova (2002) had 
emphasised the importance of shifting the focus from the visibility 
of enforcement of border controls or the “border spectacle” to the 
differentiating operation of the immigration law, which is the invisible 
foundation for migration management. The multiplication of legal 
statuses and the consequent differential inclusion of non-citizens 
form a complementary instrument for the border regime, enabling the 
regulation of immigration within territorial borders (Könönen 2018; 
Mezzadra & Neilson 2013).
Here, I understand borders as an institution that regulates the 
presence and access of non-citizens, not only at the external borders 
but also within the given society (see Balibar 2004; Rigo 2011). In 
contrast to the conception of borders as places of exclusion at the 
territorial edges, the idea of borders as an institution enables to 
capture the operation of migration governance as a complex and 
multilayer system, extending its tentacles to potentially all over the 
society. The residence permit system forms an extension of the 
border regime, which allows states to control non-citizens by other 
means and differentiate non-citizens’ access to labour markets and 
social services. Various legal statuses and respective legal identities 
function as a kind of travel pass, which enables bordering not only at 
the territorial borders as well as urban spaces but also with respect 
to all instances in which a person can be obliged to prove identity 
(see Lyon 2011). Therefore, due to the lack of identity documents 
or permanent residence status, non-citizens may encounter borders 
in the private sphere, for example in opening a bank account or 
in renting an apartment. Depending on the personal and legal 
situations, internal borders can be unnoticeable in everyday life, yet 
they can materialise unexpectedly due to changing circumstances 
or whenever access to institutions or services is denied. Internal 
borders are articulated in different and interrelated ways in the lives 
of non-citizens, becoming personalised borders, which exist for only 
some and not others.
Bordering processes continue inside the EU space, where 
non-citizens are targets of various exclusive practices, whether 
symbolic, racialised, or judicial. Here, rather than general everyday 
bordering1 (Yuval-Davies, Wemyss & Cassidy 2018) or bordering 
as spatial practice (Van Houtum & Van Naerssen 2002), I want to 
draw attention to the administrative bordering practices, through 
which borders are actually controlled and introduced inside the 
state (see Weber 2013). Thus, administrative bordering refers to the 
negotiations and processes concerning the presence and access of 
non-citizens that are both a fundamental part and a consequence 
of immigration policies. Bureaucratic procedures on the identification 
of non-citizens and qualification for the residence permits are a 
precondition for migration governance, as they are an essential 
instrument in the prevention of irregular migration (Fassin 2011). In 
addition to residence permit applications, bureaucratic procedures 
extend to various instances providing documents necessary for 
residence permit applications or otherwise regulating non-citizens’ 
access to the services, such as local registry offices, embassies, 
social services, or banks, which become involved in administrative 
bordering of non-citizens. The procedures concerning inclusion or 
exclusion of non-citizens are administrative in nature in that they are 
based on the discretion of legislation. Methodologically, the concept 
of administrative bordering indicates the examination of law in action 
(Calavita 2010): in the field of immigration, the gap between law-
on-the-books and law-in-action is more significant than in the other 
spheres of legislation (Schuck 1990).
I argue that in order to obtain a more detailed understanding 
of immigration policies, we need to examine migrants’ encounters 
with the immigration bureaucracy and the collateral effects of the 
legal status for the social position of non-citizens. For non-citizens, 
the complex immigration bureaucracy and administrative bordering 
often cause uncertainty and unpredictability of the outcomes, as they 
struggle to fulfil the bureaucratic requirements for residence permits 
or secure access to necessary services. Like all bureaucracies, 
immigration policies schematise and simplify reality (see Graeber 
2015) in determining the preconditions for different types of 
immigration, such as work, marriage, education, and their various 
sub-categories. Consequently, the residence permit system has a 
performative function in shaping migrants’ behaviour (Karakayali 
& Rigo 2010: 130) in that migrants need to modify their lives to fit 
the required procrustean schemas in order to obtain a residence 
permit. Immigration officials and other street-level bureaucrats have 
an influence on individual immigration trajectories because the 
immigration law leaves wide discretionary powers to determine the 
status and entitlements of non-citizens (see Eule 2013; Lipsky 2010). 
Border struggles emerge in situations in which migrants’ subjective 
aspirations run up against the rigid structures of immigration 
bureaucracy.
For analytical purpose, it is justifiable to focus on legal status, 
which designates a different level of exclusion compared to race, 
gender, or class (Bosniak 2006: 11). In addition, residence right 
represents a common field of struggle for moving populations, 
regardless of personal attributes. As a Nordic country, Finland offers 
an interesting context in which to examine administrative bordering 
because of the significant role of the state in providing and regulating 
social services. In the Nordic countries, the technologized regulatory 
systems mediate access to different institutions, and consequently, 
identity documents and legal status profoundly affect the organisation 
of everyday life. Border struggles take different forms, depending on 
the institutional and legislative settings, yet the analysis presented 
here has a wider significance in demonstrating the material and 
subjective consequences of administrative bordering within the state 
for legally residing non-citizens as well.
Data and methods
This article focuses on non-citizens’ border struggles in the context 
of the residence permit system in Finland. In 2017, 21,340 new 
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residence permits were issued for non-EU migrants, officially called 
as third country nationals, on the basis of employment, studies, and 
family relations. Additionally, 3,748 people received a residence 
permit through the asylum process. In the migration research, entry 
categories are usually used as an indicator of distinct social groups, 
consequently reproducing the governmental framework in academia 
(see Crawley & Skleparis 2018). Yet, governmental categorisations 
are external to migrants’ subjective reasons, as highlighted in the 
discussion on autonomy of migration (Mezzadra & Neilson 2013; 
Papadopoulos & Tsianos 2013). Moreover, autonomy of migration 
takes place also inside the state as migrants work regardless of 
the entry category or apply for a residence permit on new grounds. 
Instead of conceiving the entry categories as identities or migrants 
as representatives of ethnic groups, I focus here on the migrants’ 
negotiations with the immigration system before obtaining permanent 
residency. Regardless of the entry category, conditional legal 
position forms a common feature in the immigration process (see 
Golding & Landolt 2013: 15–16). Indeed, the legal residence status 
as such does not necessarily guarantee a secure position. For 
example, in Finland, non-EU students are excluded from the welfare 
state services, including public health care, consequently being in 
a relatively precarious legal position comparable to asylum seekers 
(see also Maury 2017).
This article is based on 32 semi-structured in-depth interviews 
with non-EU migrants from Africa and Asia,2 who shared in common 
the conditionality of their legal status and a precarious position in 
the labour markets. Interviewees had arrived in Finland mainly as 
students and asylum seekers, yet at the date of the interview, in 
most cases, their legal status had changed, consequently resulting 
in a series of aberrant combinations between the governmental 
categories of asylum, work, study, and marriage. The interviews 
were conducted primarily in 2010 in Helsinki by the author in 
English, except for four interviews in Finnish. On the date of the 
interview, the participants had been in Finland for approximately 
2–4 years. Of the interviewed migrants, 26 were men and 6 were 
women, and most were between 25 and 35 years of age. The 
interviews lasted for approximately 90 minutes and were transcribed 
for the analysis. The themes discussed in the interviews included 
participants’ migration history, experiences in the labour markets, 
residence permit process, and organisation of life in Finland. The 
transcriptions used in this article are slightly edited for purposes 
of readability, when necessary. To ensure the anonymity of the 
participants, the interview extracts are contextualised only with 
respect to nationality, permit type, and residence time. In addition 
to the interviews, the analysis is informed by the author’s 10 years 
of experience in migration solidarity activism in Finland. Practical 
experience in translating bureaucratic regulations and assisting 
in residence permit applications provides valuable information 
about the practices of administrative bordering on immigration and 
supports the analysis of the interview data.
The empirical analysis concentrates on different, yet interrelated, 
aspects of bordering during the immigration process. First, I address 
how the lack of identity documents complicates the organisation of 
everyday life. Second, I concentrate on the bureaucratic struggle 
involved in applying for a residence permit. Third, I examine the 
collateral effects of the legal status for the social position of non-
citizens. Fourth, I address the pervasive insecurity related to 
the immigration process. The observations in this article are not 
generalisable to all migrant populations in Finland; rather the aim 
of this article is to highlight different instances of administrative 
bordering and its consequences for non-citizens.
Everyday obstacles in organisation of life
Regardless of the entry category, migrants pursue their personal 
aspirations and are involved in different social spheres but under 
different legal preconditions. In this chapter, I address the problems in 
organising life without official identification documents, which concern 
mainly asylum seekers who do not have a passport and face similar 
problems as undocumented migrants (see Bloch, Sigona & Zetter 
2014). The asylum process can proceed linearly, and the immigration 
office issues alien passports for recognised humanitarian migrants, 
who they direct to integration services. Yet, the interviewed African 
migrants in particular were disillusioned with the asylum system and 
aware of the slight possibility of being recognised as a refugee. In 
Finland, a controlled reception system, in which asylum-seekers are 
entitled to free accommodation in reception centres often in peripheral 
locations, exists alongside the freedom to move and independently 
arrange accommodation. The asylum process, including the appeals, 
can take years to complete, which gives migrants borrowed time to 
consider alternative plans for legalisation. Often, asylum seekers 
have only the reception centre card, which complicates organisation 
of everyday life and can, for example, prevent entrance to nightclubs 
because of unconfirmed age, as one interviewee explained:
They give you some ID-card to live in Finland. But this is not 
an official ID. I can’t use it for anything. I can’t even have a bus 
card or go to nightclubs. It’s just a piece of paper; nobody takes 
it seriously. It’s almost useless. [...] I also have a paper that says 
I can work legally, but if I go with that paper to employers, they 
don’t give me a job because it looks like I have made it myself. 
(Sri Lanka, asylum seeker, 1 year in Finland)
Those interviewees who had moved to Helsinki during the asylum 
process shared apartments with acquaintances. According to 
the interviewees, ethnic communities facilitate the organisation 
of everyday life by sharing information and resources, such as 
providing assistance in finding employment and making informal 
accommodation arrangements (see Wills et al. 2011). To maintain 
the right to the reception services, asylum seekers need a registered 
address, which can be difficult to obtain because of the restrictions on 
the number of inhabitants permitted in rental agreements. Opening 
a bank account is another problem complicating the everyday life 
of those who do not possess a valid passport, because banks are 
obliged to authenticate client’s identity due to the legislation to 
prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism. According 
to the interviewees, some banks had refused to open a bank account 
for asylum seekers despite having a passport. Banks represent 
an instance of administrative bordering in that they regulate non-
citizens’ access to necessary services, but different interpretations 
of the regulation caused confusion for the interviewees. The absence 
of a personal bank account increases dependency on third parties 
in handling practical matters and produces shadowy arrangements:
Even now, I don’t have a bank account. I went to the bank, but 
they say no, we cannot open an account for you because you 
don’t have a passport. My boss has a separate account, where 
he pays the salaries and gives us the money in cash. I am not the 
only one who is in this situation; there are other people who have 
the same problem. (Nigeria, asylum seeker, 2 years in Finland)
The complex immigration legislation causes confusion also for 
employers who may be suspicious of asylum seekers’ permission 
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to work legally, even if they get a certificate for the right to work. 
In Finland, asylum seekers are allowed to work without restrictions 
after 3 or 6 months, depending on whether or not they possess valid 
documents on arrival. The purpose of the regulation is to sanction 
intentional disposal of identity documents before arrival, although 
there is no evidence to support the aforementioned claim (e.g. Valenta 
& Thorshaug 2012). However, the tax office issues tax cards for non-
citizens and creates a temporary social security number for taxation 
purposes, even if the person would not be entitled to work legally. 
The possession of a passport facilitates the organisation of everyday 
life, yet arrangements of a bank account, a registered address, and 
other bureaucratic procedures are part of the immigration process, 
even if one has a residence permit at arrival. One interviewee, who 
had arrived in Finland for the purpose of study and later applied for a 
work permit, summarised the immigration process as an acquisition 
of “every kind of paper”:
Here, you people love papers and stamps. [...] All the time you 
have to apply for permits; all the time you have to go the police 
station. You need to acquire every kind of paper. At one point 
I thought about going back to my home country because this 
country is becoming so difficult for me. (Cameroon, student/work 
permit, 3 years in Finland)
Migrants do find alternative ways to overcome everyday obstacles, 
such as using acquaintances’ bank accounts, sharing travel cards, 
or borrowing identification documents, but obtaining a residence 
permit becomes the primary concern in the immigration process if 
the asylum application is rejected or the legal residence status is set 
to expire. A residence permit can also be applied for in Finland, but 
it necessitates initiative and networks due to the absence of official 
support services for residence permit processes.3 Moreover, the 
immigration system demands “interpretative labour” (Graeber 2015) 
from applicants to understand the complex immigration bureaucracy, 
which can be difficult to navigate, even for Finnish citizens. Yet, 
even if one has a valid ground for a residence permit, administrative 
bordering practices complicate the application process.
Negotiating the residence permit system
For migrants in irregular situations, there are three options in addition 
to the asylum system for obtaining a residence permit: marriage, 
employment, and study programmes, each of which designates 
different bureaucratic preconditions. Status mobility (Schuster 2005) 
is an inherent feature of immigration controls because first residence 
permits are transient in nature (Freedland & Costello 2015: 4). While 
most legal statuses allow migrants a continuation towards permanent 
residence, non-EU graduates in Finland only can receive a 1-year 
(previously 6-month) extension of their residence permit for the 
purpose of job hunting. As a result, after graduation, student migrants 
can be in situations similar to those of rejected asylum seekers in 
that they need to find new grounds for continuation of residence. 
For the interviewees, the main legalising strategy was to apply for 
a work permit. Yet, the tight work permit policies caused problems 
for employed interviewees despite being able to support themselves, 
either because of irregular working hours or on the basis of labour 
market testing, as in the following case:
Yes, I applied for the work permit, but they didn’t accept it. 
Because they say we are giving work permits only for cleaning 
jobs. For my job, I’m in the restaurant field. They say there are 
enough Finnish people to do restaurant work, so there is no 
need for foreigners. But there are still a lot of open vacancies in 
the Employment Office. And my boss said we need you at the 
workplace. We can take care of ourselves, but they didn’t give 
the permit. (Nigeria, student, 2 years in Finland)
The sectors eligible for work permits are dependent on the labour 
market testing, i.e. assessment of labour shortages in the different 
sectors in the country. Because of the labour market testing, cleaning 
has become the principal sector that allows migrants to obtain a work 
permit without prior qualifications. Trade unions and representatives 
of employers have a hand in administrative bordering in the labour 
markets as they participate in the formulation of guidelines of the 
availability of labour (see Alho 2013). In practice, the work permit 
application is contingent on the benevolence of employers due to 
the requirement of a full-time employment and long processing times 
(Könönen 2015). In addition to the bureaucratic application form, 
which consists of several pages of questions on the applicant’s work 
and personal situation, the employer needs to provide attachments 
to work permit application detailing the company’s recruitment history 
and financial affairs. Employers act as border guards through the 
obligation to control non-citizens’ legal preconditions to work (Yuval-
Davis, Wemyss & Cassidy 2018), but they can also directly sanction 
non-citizens’ residence along with the state (Rigo 2011: 208). 
Residence permits are contingent on the existence of the grounds 
for which the permit is issued; thus, termination of the employment 
contract can lead to “illegality” with respect to work permits, as 
divorce can endanger the residence right of marriage migrants. For 
example, ineligibility for a permanent residence after a divorce came 
as surprise to a comfortably settled interviewee.
It’s amusing because, in six months, my permit will not be valid 
anymore. I went to reapply for the permit a couple of weeks ago. 
They asked directly what I am still doing here because I have 
divorced the Finnish man, which is why I came here. I have to 
go back to my home country or explain the reason why I really 
want to be here. I said I have a permanent job, I have friends, and 
all my life is here. [...] And I have a man I love, a fiancé: we are 
getting married. But he [the police] said that these are not good 
reasons. I don’t know; the process takes four months. Let’s see 
if they accept it or not. (Morocco, marriage, 4 years in Finland)
Marriage is another option for legalisation for non-citizens, yet the 
application for a marriage permit can be a complicated and time-
consuming process as well if the country does not have an embassy 
or consulate in Helsinki. To get married at the local registry office, 
in addition to having a passport, a non-citizen needs to request 
certification of bachelorhood from the country of origin. For example, 
for West African nationals, the requested certification needs to be 
individually verified by a consulting law firm, charging currently 
considerable 580 euros for their services. The mandatory twofold 
process creates a profitable business for a private agency, an 
example of the privatisation of the administrative bordering and the 
growing migration industry (see Andersson 2015). Because of the 
processing fees, currently up to 520 euros for the first residence 
permit application, a non-citizen may need to spend more than 
1,000 euros in total in applying for a residence permit on the basis of 
marriage. In addition to the processing fees, the income requirements 
for the issuance of residence permits caused financial problems for 
the interviewees, especially for non-EU students, who currently need 
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to demonstrate possessing 6,720 euros of available funds per year. 
Although the existing work contract can be accepted as an indicator 
of self-sufficiency, the practices of the immigration office appear to be 
very strict, as in the following case:
I was very, very depressed. When I made the school application, 
I didn’t have the money, that’s true. But they had my working 
contract, they had my payslips. Normally, the condition is that if 
you don’t have the 6,000 euros, but you can show you are self-
supporting, if you get around 500 euros per month, it’s fine. [...] 
Then I was getting about 800 euros per month so I didn’t really 
understand. The lady who made the decision said she wasn’t 
sure if I really wanted to study; she thinks that I know a bit about 
the system and the law, and so I want to play some kind of trick to 
get the permit, and she’s not sure I’m going to study. (Cameroon, 
asylum seeker/student, 3 years in Finland)
The interviewee lived undocumented for a year because of the 
negative decision until he was granted a study permit. The application 
was rejected based on the paragraph on circumventing entry 
regulations, which give the immigration authorities broad discretion. 
Paradoxically, knowledge of the immigration system, which is a 
prerequisite for legalisation, can turn against the applicant. Based 
on the interviews, administrative bordering seemed to target African 
migrants in particular, whose applications were subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny. In a similar way, other studies have highlighted a culture 
of suspicion in the decision-making practices in family reunification 
processes (see Leinonen & Pellander 2014; Tapaninen & Helen 
2013). Indeed, while many research participants did manage to get 
a residence permit on new grounds, at least two interviewed African 
nationals were deported, despite having applications pending.
Collateral effects of legal status
The binary distinction between legal status and “illegal” status has 
little analytical value in understanding the immigration process 
because the preconditions of residence and non-citizens’ entitlements 
vary significantly between the various legal statuses (Könönen 
2018). Goldring and Landolt (2013) refer to the immigration system 
as “chutes and ladders”, where one can climb upwards to a more 
secure position, yet can just as easily slide downwards to “illegality”. 
While the acquisition of any kind of permit is an acute concern to 
migrants in irregular situations, the type of residence permit that is 
issued shapes the immigration trajectory and have collateral effects 
on the social position of non-citizens with regard to family life, access 
to social services and labour markets, therefore creating yet another 
level of differentiation. Interestingly, after receiving a work permit, one 
asylum seeker commented, “It was in a way better not to have this 
permit”:
Somehow it’s better because I now have municipal residency, 
which I didn’t have before. And now I got my passport back 
so, for example, I could travel somewhere if I want. [...] I’m just 
worried about what kind of continuous permit it is. Does it mean 
I have to continue in this sector until the end of my life? Because 
it’s not the job I want. But sometimes you don’t have a choice. 
(Afghanistan, asylum seeker/work permit, 4 years in Finland)
Work can become a substitute for international protection, but 
overcoming one obstacle can mean having to confront others, in this 
case, restricted mobility in the labour markets. Work permit holders are 
allowed to work only in the prescribed sector, whereas non-citizens 
are exempted from the sectorial restrictions in the labour market, 
including asylum seekers. The sectorial work permit allows a person 
to change employer in the prescribed sector, but switching to another 
sector requires a new procedure and carries with it the risk of a negative 
decision. The work permit increases dependency on the employer in 
that the residence right is connected with employment until a permanent 
residence permit is obtained. The limitations to labour market mobility 
further immobilise migrant workers, restricting their “exit power” from 
poor or even intolerable working conditions (cf. Alberti 2015).
Obtaining a work permit or a residence permit other than an 
international protection status can also affect directly on the family 
life because only international protection statuses entitle to family 
reunification without a proof of income. Income requirements depend 
on family size and currently amount to 2,600 euros of net income per 
month for a family of two adults and two minors. Although there is the 
possibility of individual consideration and state subsidies can reduce 
the income requirement, based on this research, the decision-making 
at the immigration office seemed to be inflexible. One interviewee, 
who had received a residence permit on individual reasons instead 
of international protection, had been separated from his family for 
years because of the income requirement for family reunification. 
Although the court later overruled the decision, he was frustrated on 
the situation at the date of interview.
I have tried to apply for family reunification, but they say I need 
3,000 euros income per month. What kind of job can I do to have 
in hand 3,000 euros per month? Maybe if you are a doctor you 
can, but I am not a doctor. But what can I do if the authorities 
decide that way? [...] It’s really hard to live apart from your family. 
I cannot go back there, but I am not sure if I want to live like this. 
(Congo, asylum seeker/humanitarian permit, 4 years in Finland)
Officials can use discretion also for the benefit of a non-citizen: for 
example, one interviewed student did receive extensive treatment 
in a hospital despite being undocumented at that time. The welfare 
services are an important site of administrative bordering, both at 
the municipal level and the level of a national insurance institution 
because of the complex intersections between immigration and social 
security legislation (see Könönen 2018). Despite the residence-based 
welfare system in Finland, access to public services is contingent on 
the legal status instead of de facto residence (see Corrigan 2014). 
Yet, in Helsinki, the registry offices have interpreted the municipality 
law to mean that unconfirmed identity prevents registration, thereby 
excluding those legal residents who do not have an original passport 
from municipal services. This happened to one interviewee, who was 
denied a registration in the municipality after obtaining a work permit.
I work in Helsinki, I study in Helsinki, I live in Helsinki. I have a 
residence permit, but they won’t give the municipal residency. 
I want a permanent social security number. I went to the local 
registry office, but they say they cannot give it because I don’t 
have a passport. I have an alien passport, but they won’t register 
me because my identity is not clear. I don’t understand that. Now, 
I cannot get a bus card, and if I get sick, I don’t know if I can 
go to the doctor. (Kenya, asylum seeker/work permit, 2 years in 
Finland).
In the interviews, negotiations with the welfare institutions were not 
emphasised, because the participants were employed or were not 
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entitled to public services. Nevertheless, rather than designating a 
straightforward inclusion in the society, obtaining a residence permit 
can mean new obstacles and complications in the immigration 
process. In addition to the type of legal status, administrative 
bordering and strict interpretations of legislation can significantly 
modify non-citizens’ social position. In the interviews, administrative 
bordering appeared primarily as inflexible practices, consequently 
creating insecurity and unpredictability of the outcomes.
Enduring insecurity of presence and future
Along with the external obstacles explored in the previous sections, 
administrative bordering shapes non-citizens’ social position and 
modifies their orientation in the world. While it has been suggested 
that legal status is relevant only insofar as it concretely restricts the 
activities of migrants (Cvajner & Sciortino 2010), borders invade 
the mind and get under the skin. In addition to the long-lasting 
consequences for migrants’ position in the labour markets (see 
Goldring & Landolt 2011), precarious and conditional legal statuses 
cause enduring insecurity of presence and future for non-citizens. 
Based on the interviews, the participants were often confused 
about their legal position. In addition to bureaucratic language, 
inadequate translation services on the decisions delivered in Finnish 
can exacerbate the obscurity of the immigration system. Exclusion 
of personal contact between the subject and the decision-makers 
contributes to social indifference but the impersonal bureaucracy and 
administrative bordering also increase the fear of unexpected turns 
in the immigration process, however unlikely. Insecurity materialises 
in calls to appear at the police station or in decisions arriving at 
unannounced times by mail, as one interviewee who was waiting for 
the final appeal on the asylum decision explained:
It’s the kind of a process in which we have to get used to always 
waiting. For me, for example, as I am living in Finland, every day 
when I open my door, I am just shocked on receiving some mail; 
what kind of mail is waiting for me today? It’s my everyday life 
thinking... Because I and other foreigners like me are living in 
such conditions that any day any kind of decision can be outside 
our door. We don’t know; we can’t be sure about it. This is 
something that psychologically causes huge pressure. Because 
you are not sure about your situation: what will be the next step, 
the next decision? Because it’s very easy for Finns or somebody 
who is living normally; they do not have to be surprised by any 
mail, everything is ok. For us, every day we are wondering, will 
your decision arrive today? (Afghanistan, asylum seeker/work 
permit, 4 years in Finland)
Insecurity of the residence right extends beyond the present and is 
experienced as confusion and psychological stress, as described 
in the quotation above. The residence permit system divides the 
immigration process into waiting periods, which involves a possibility 
of a negative decision regardless of the length of residence. The 
immigration process is characterised by “institutionalised uncertainty” 
(Anderson 2010), which affects the experience of time and the 
possibilities to make plans for the future. Insecurity of presence and 
future relates to the lack of security and assurance against unexpected 
events. In the end, a permanent residence status designates an 
important threshold in that it guarantees a position similar to citizen 
status and mitigates insecurity about residence, although a criminal 
sentence can trigger the deportation process. While the permanent 
residence permit can be applied for after 4 years of legal residence, 
in practice, it takes longer due to various combinations of different 
permit types. Somewhat confusingly, only half the time spent on a 
temporary permit is acknowledged in calculating the total residence 
time. The insecurity and prolonged waiting for permanent status 
complicate the settlement, as one interviewee explained:
It is a really difficult and long process to get the permanent 
[permit]; they give the permit for a year and then for another 
year. Next year I can apply for a permanent [permit]. I don’t know 
why we have to wait so long, like 7 or 8 years; then you might 
get the permanent [permit]. Because of the waiting time, how 
can I adapt to this society when I don’t know what will happen 
tomorrow? [...] I have had serious depression. I am constantly 
afraid that Finland will deport me and my child. And there [in the 
home country] we don’t have anything. The child goes to school 
here, she has adapted to life here. (China, asylum seeker/work 
permit/international protection, 6 years in Finland)
Residence permit processes are emotionally laden in that an entire 
future and every type of investment in the migration are at stake – not 
only for oneself but also for accompanying minors and potentially for 
other family members. While the psychological stress of the asylum 
process (e.g. Rider 2014) and immigrant detention (Turnbull 2016) 
have been addressed in the migration research, similar mental 
pressures can characterise the whole residence permit procedure 
until the securing of a permanent status. Psychological effects of the 
immigration system for non-citizens highlighted by the interviewees 
resemble to some extent the mental and psychical disorders of the 
oppressed, which was examined by Fanon (2008) in the context 
of colonialism. Several interviewees talked about the depression 
caused by fear of deportation, which is highlighted in the situation of 
prolonged deportability (de Genova 2002). One interviewee ended 
up being undocumented because the police could not implement 
the removal and the immigration office did not issue a temporary 
residence permit to him as was stipulated by the law at the time. He 
related how the immigration authorities “are killing me slowly” and 
that he is “a zero man” because of his lack of a residence permit:
My life depends on this. I can’t do anything, I can’t study, I can’t 
work. What can I do? As I said, I live in a prison: not in one room: 
I can walk around in the city, but it’s still like a prison for me. [...] 
I just want to have the permit first, be sure that I can live here, and 
then officially marry my partner. And then travel, get somewhere 
out of Finland, travel sometime, a month or two weeks. (Iran, 
asylum seeker/undocumented, 5 years in Finland)
The conditional legal status shapes non-citizens’ temporal 
orientations (Villegas 2014), affecting also intimate relations. In 
other words, the insecurity of residence can designate a suspended 
life, in that preconditions for independent life are contingent on 
the residence permit process (Könönen 2015). While the subject 
positions established by the immigration controls are external 
to migrants’ diverse life situations, legal status can become an 
embodied condition as the immigration law becomes inseparable 
from life. Internal borders and related practices of administrative 
bordering shape non-citizens’ being-in-the-world in different ways, 
depending on the available resources and support networks, yet with 
enduring consequences, even for settled immigrants.
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Conclusions
In this article, I have examined administrative bordering and the 
different materialisations of borders during the immigration process 
based on the interviews with non-citizens in Finland. The focus 
on non-citizens’ border struggles reveals the non-linear nature of 
immigration, which consists of negotiations with the immigration 
bureaucracy and overcoming various bureaucratic obstacles. 
Moreover, the immigration process may involve transitions between 
the immigration categories, for example from humanitarian migrant 
(asylum seeker) to labour migrant (work permit holder). The residence 
right represents the primary field of struggle for non-citizens, yet the 
residence permit application for the purpose of studies, employment, 
or marriage requires various documents and proofs of qualification, 
whose acquisition can complicate the immigration process, even 
if one has valid grounds for the permit. Additionally, the type of 
residence permit that is issued can designate new borders with 
respect to the labour markets, family reunification, and welfare 
services. While personal situations and available resources affect 
the relevance of internal borders, complex bureaucratic procedures 
and practices of administrative bordering increase the insecurity and 
uncertainty of non-citizens’ presence and access.
While the empirical observations here are based on the 
analysis of border struggles in Finland, I argue that administrative 
bordering is an essential part of migration management, which 
takes place increasingly within the state. Contrary to the prevalent 
conception of external borders as sites of inclusion or exclusion in 
the migration literature and the idealised view of integration as an 
adaptation of cultural norms, non-citizens are in a conditional legal 
position for years before obtaining a permanent residence permit. 
The immigration process can and often does proceed linearly when 
non-citizens follow the designated entry path towards citizenship. 
Nevertheless, during this transitory period, non-citizens are subject 
to various administrative processes, which can significantly shape 
their social position and the immigration process. While immigration 
involves encounters with “new social–cultural boundaries” created 
by everyday bordering practices and related to the politics of 
belonging (Yuval-Davis, Wemyss & Cassidy 2018), the concept of 
administrative bordering introduced here emphasises the concrete 
practices of migration management. In addition to the state 
bureaucrats, administrative bordering incorporates all the instances 
that participate in the regulation of non-citizens’ presence and access 
or inclusion and exclusion. Analysis of the micropolitics of immigration 
controls or law in action should be essential in migration research, 
because beyond the border spectacle, migration management is 
essentially a bureaucratic business.
Immigration policies cannot be reduced to a simple application 
of legislation because the immigration law leaves state authorities a 
significant discretionary power in its implementation. The inflexibility 
of immigration policies causes insecurity not only for non-citizens 
but also for their family members, fellow employees, friends, or 
partners. Increased bureaucratisation of immigration is motivated 
by security concerns and the prevention of irregular migration, but 
the rigid practices of administrative bordering can complicate the 
immigration process and, in the worst case, transform non-citizens to 
undocumented migrants. There is a need to develop more inclusive 
practices in immigration policies to acknowledge variations in life 
situations and thereby endeavour to facilitate migrant settlement. 
In the context of immigration, bureaucracy as a depoliticised and 
impersonal mode of government can produce the most personal and 
political outcomes.
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Notes
1. Yuval-Davies, Wemyss & Cassidy (2018: 229) defined bordering 
as “the everyday construction of borders through ideology, 
cultural mediation, discourses, political institutions, attitudes 
and everyday forms of transnationalism”.
2. The interviewees were from Afghanistan, Cameroon, China, 
Congo, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, 
Turkey, and Zimbabwe.
3. Currently, all the applications need to be left in person for 
purposes of verifying the applicant’s identity and recording 
biometric identifiers, carrying the risk of a detention order for 
those having an effective removal decision. Additionally, an 
administrative regulation (introduced in 2016) necessitates the 
applicant to acquire a passport from the country of origin in 
order for a residence permit to be issued.
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